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Abstract
To date little to no empirical research has been conducted on the Sovereign Citizen
Movement (SCM) and how it fits into the broader far-right domestic terrorist movement. The
main focus of this study is to determine if there is a significant difference between the SCM and
the far-right in their demographic composition, trial strategies, and trial behaviors and whether
the SCM should be grouped together with the broader far-right during analysis. Using the
American Terrorism Study (ATS), I coded 97 federal court cases involving sovereign citizen
defendants (N=150) and ran basic frequencies on demographic and trial behavior variables on
the SCM defendants and compared them to the non-sovereign citizen far-right defendants
(N=382) in the ATS; the two groups were different at every level. I then ran bivariate analysis to
determine the significance in the differences between the two groups. Results showed that all of
the differences between the two groups were significant in relation to demographics, how
sovereign citizens behave during trial, and how the government prosecutes sovereign citizen
defendants. In conclusion, the SCM is significantly, and substantially, different and should be
studied separately from the broader far-right when conducting future research.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

Beginning in 1993, sovereign citizen Winfield Thomas began selling fraudulent anti-tax
trusts in Ohio by promoting them as estate planning vehicles to people who attended his
seminars. Thomas maintained that the trusts provided asset protection to his clients. During the
seminars Thomas often advised his clients to set up bank accounts using their trusts. He argued
that any payments made out of the trust bank accounts would be tax deductible. In reality, the
trust scheme was nothing more than an illegal strategy to hide monetary assets from the IRS.
Thomas sold his trusts to approximately four hundred clients for $2,000 a piece, receiving nearly
$142,000 in annual revenue. Chad Rickle purchased a trust from Thomas after attending a
seminar. After building rapport with Thomas and others involved in the conspiracy, and using
his college degree and experience in accounting, Rickle began to prepare tax returns in 1994 for
individuals who purchased a trust. Thomas taught Rickle how to prepare fraudulent trusts and
individual income tax returns in a way consistent with the scheme Thomas was promoting. By
1997 the IRS began sending letters to the trust scheme clients requiring them to make good on
their unpaid taxes. Thomas and Rickle told their clients that if they kept their heads down and
ignored the IRS, the problem would go away. It did not.
Between 1999 and 2000 Thomas had added Redemption Scheme (discussed later) as a
new strategy for the clients to obstruct the IRS. Clients of the trust scam prepared and sent to the
IRS $28 million in bogus "Bills of Exchange," drafts, and other fictitious financial instruments in
an effort to pay off their tax obligations. The conspirators prepared over 900 fraudulent tax
returns from 1994 to 2000 for an estimated tax loss of over $1,000,000, while they earned an
average of $22,000 a year from preparing the returns. In addition, between 1993 to 2006
1

Thomas and his co-conspirators helped their clients avoid paying over $15 million in taxes to the
IRS.
Winfield Thomas and his co-conspirators were affiliated with a movement of far-right
domestic extremists called the Sovereign Citizen Movement. According to the FBI (2011),
sovereign citizens are “anti-government extremists who believe that even though they physically
reside in this country, they are separate or ‘sovereign’ from the United States” (p. 1). Sovereigns
believe that they are not subject to the authority of federal or state governments, and their actions
often result in devastating consequences. Sovereign citizens act on these beliefs by using tactics
that authorities have described as “paper terrorism.” Paper terrorism, which will be discussed in
more detail later, is the use of financial instruments (such as frivolous tax returns or bogus liens)
to target the government and its employees. The case study above is a prime example of paper
terrorism and the large-scale monetary consequences faced by the government due to the radical
beliefs of sovereign citizens.
To date, little is known about the demographics of sovereign citizens or the nature of the
threat that sovereign citizens pose even though police consider them to be a significant threat in
their communities. Moreover, I could find almost no empirical research on the Sovereign
Citizen Movement as a separate entity of far-right extremism. When the Sovereign Citizen
Movement has been addressed in extant literature, the focus has been on violence rather than
paper terrorism. This research examines how the Sovereign Citizen Movement differs from that
of far-right domestic terrorists as a whole and will make a case for studying sovereign citizens
separately from the far-right. For this purpose, I will examine the following research question:
How similar are adherents of the Sovereign Citizen Movement to defendants in the broader
far-right movement? This paper will also examine the sovereign citizen’s behaviors throughout
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the trial process in an effort to understand how the followers of the movement act towards the
authority of the federal court system. For that purpose, I will examine the following research
question: What methods have the federal courts used to prosecute SCM adherents, and how
have those individuals behaved in court?
The following chapter will provide a detailed background of the movement to establish a
timeline of how it has grown into the most prominent anti-government movement currently in
the United States. The chapter will conclude with more detailed explanation of my research
questions.
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CHAPTER TWO
BACKGROUND

This project focuses on the Sovereign Citizen Movement (SCM) as a subtype of far-right
domestic terrorism steeped in anti-government ideology. Emphasis is placed on ascertaining
demographic information on the adherents of SCM ideology. An additional goal of this paper is
to determine empirically whether the SCM differs significantly from far-right extremism in terms
of demographics and trial behaviors, but I will also examine whether the government uses
different strategies to prosecute SCM adherents. The first section of this chapter contains a
synopsis of the history of the SCM and a timeline centered on how the SCM grew into a
dangerous far-right terrorist movement.

Economic and Social Factors
The 1960s and the Vietnam War brought with it the rise of the extremist far-left, which in the
United States was mostly made up of college students and college graduates who fought against
what they believed to be the United States government’s overreach in foreign nations (Smith,
2000). The far-left was built upon an ideology of socialist beliefs and a hatred of capitalism
resulting in a movement that was arguably more bloody and violent than what would be felt by
the far-right in the years to come. The persistent violence within the far-left movement resulted
in many leftist sympathizers distancing themselves from the violent groups. So by the time the
Vietnam War ended the zeal of the far-left had already begun to dwindle, paving the way for the
emergence of a new ideology of far-right groups in the 1970s (Smith & Morgan, 1994). The
1980s brought with it an influx of homegrown, domestic terrorist organizations that continued to
grow in numbers throughout the subsequent decades. Numerous extremist groups started to gain
4

traction in collective opposition to issues of affirmative action, welfare, race mixing,
homosexuality, and abortion (Smith, 1994; Smith, 2000). Far-right groups formed along a
myriad of motivational factors—such as white supremacy, anti-gun legislation, anti-abortion,
anti-Semitism, and a fringe religious movement, called Christian Identity (discussed in more
detail below). Furthermore, the social conflicts of the 1980s mixed with another powerful
motivator—a struggling economy.
The 1980s witnessed growth in the far-right for many reasons, and chief among them was
the economy. Indeed, a national economic crisis was being felt across the country. The farm
crisis of the 1980s, and the bank crisis that followed, had a severe and profoundly negative
impact on the United States’ economy. According to Kent (2015), “issues that gave rise to the
Freemen and sovereign citizens’ forerunner in the 1970s, the Posse Comitatus, involved
enormous jumps in interest rates as banks reacted to global political and trade realities; but these
increases crippled farmers, many of whom had taken out low-interest loans” (p. 7-8). The farm
crisis resulted in an estimated 235,000 farms failing, which also destroyed 60,000 supportive
businesses in the process. Additionally, many banks failed because they were dependent on the
mortgage and debt payments from the farmers that were affected by the crisis (Kent, 2015).
Overlapping with the farm crisis, the Savings and Loan crisis, which started during the late
1980s, resulted in 1,000 banks closing their doors and the loss of over $500 billion in assets.
Due to the poor economic conditions of the country and the federal government using tax dollars
to bail out the banks, the number of people in the United States who believed that federal income
taxes were too high reached record levels during this time period. According to Levitas (2001),
an anti-tax movement quickly began to grow throughout the country. During the 1980s, the
federal government created new laws in an attempt to slow the growth of the anti-tax movement
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by prosecuting anti-tax protestors more harshly (Levitas, 2001). The new laws were not as
effective as the government had hoped, and the anti-tax movement was slowed down rather than
immobilized completely. The economic crises helped to influence the growth of antigovernment movements across the country, especially that of the Posse Comitatus and the early
SCM. However, before the economic crises, the leaders of the Posse Comitatus and their
extremist anti-government ideologies heavily influenced the SCM since its formation.

The Role of Extremist Ideologies and Leaders
According to Smith (1994) the extreme right became linked to the Christian Identity Movement.
The Christian Identity Movement was ideologically centered on the belief that members of the
Aryan race were God’s chosen people, not the Jews, and that America was God’s promised land
reserved for Aryans alone. The ideology was built around radical interpretations of the Bible and
it was embedded with conspiracy theories that the United States government had been infiltrated
completely by Jews creating what the movement called the Zionist Occupational Government. It
is under this belief system that the numerous far–right groups emerged.
Within the far-right movement, a Christian Identity patriot group emerged in 1969 under
the leadership of Henry Beach and William Potter Gale in Portland, Oregon, called the Posse
Comitatus. This group would have an important influence on what would later become the
Sovereign Citizen Movement. The Posse Comitatus, whose name translates to power of the
county, combined an anti-taxation and anti-government ideology with the anti-Semitism of the
Christian Identity Movement that allowed the group to quickly gain traction with numerous
supporters and expand to thirteen additional states within a few years of its inception (Smith,
1994). Posse Comitatus adherents espoused the idea that the county sheriff, specifically one that
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they had personally voted into office, was the highest form of authority and the only authority
that the group recognized (Kent, 2015; Fleishman, 2004). Members of the Posse Comitatus
embraced the belief that the federal government had no power over them. A common expression
of this belief was their refusal to pay taxes. As the years progressed the Posse Comitatus became
increasingly violent and encouraged people in the rural parts of the country to defend their
homes from the government while the group’s leaders threatened to execute government officials
who violated their oaths of office (Smith, 1994). The surge in violent rhetoric and acts closely
coincided with the agriculture crisis sweeping the nation in the late 1970s and early 1980s, which
allowed Gale and the Posse to spread their ideology to struggling farmers across the farm belt
(Levitas, 1998). It was during this time of economic crisis that the SCM began to take form as
an offshoot of the Posse Comitatus. It is important to discuss the Posse Comitatus in this
research because it developed much of the anti-government discourse that eventually provided
the SCM with the rhetoric it now uses today. However, despite getting a boost from the Posse
Comitatus during the 1970s, the ideology of the SCM did not fully form until the 1980s (AntiDefamation League [ADL], 2012).
William Gale, a farmer himself, was extremely upset with the federal government during
the crisis. He used his newly founded Posse Comitatus to fight against the banking system and
the government. Gale’s actions served only to heighten the federal government’s awareness of
both the growing anti-tax agenda and the SCM, which quickly gained notoriety as an offshoot of
the Posse Comitatus (Kent, 2015). However, the rise of the SCM was short lived. As the farm
crisis abated in the late 1980s, the SCM also faded (Steinback, 2011). The SCM then reemerged
for a brief period of time in the 1990s as a result of high profile government conflicts that
occurred across the country.
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High Profile Conflicts
During the 1990s, three major events had a profound impact on the Sovereign Citizen Movement
and far-right terrorism as a whole. Two of these events acted as catalysts to the far-right—Ruby
Ridge in 1992 and Waco in 1993. The final event, the Oklahoma City bombing, extinguished
the spark that had been ignited in the far-right during the two years leading up to it. Ruby Ridge
and Waco created a total body count just shy of 90 people, and the far-right took violent
exception to these deaths. More profoundly, the far-right identified with the victims. Preaching
to anyone who would listen, the right argued that the deaths of these individuals were the direct
result of an overreach of federal government power. The violence fueled the far-right’s antigovernment hatred and resulted in an increase of extremist activity. From 1993 through 1994,
the far-right saw a surge of growth in its numbers that it had not seen since the 1980s. Timothy
McVeigh then bombed the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City in 1995, temporarily
chilling the growth of the extreme right. The bombing forced many far-right groups and their
members underground as law enforcement focused its investigative efforts solely on members of
far-right extremist organizations. A few years after the OKC bombing, militia and patriot groups
began to resurface, this time in response to the globalist conspiracy of the New World Order
(Pitcavage, 2001). Militia and patriot groups are related to the SCM in terms of anti-government
beliefs, but Pitcavage argues that there are important differences, especially among their
ideologies and tactics. Patriot and militia groups rely on paramilitary tactics and heavy
weaponry, while the SCM focuses its attention on acts of paper terrorism. Though the patriot
movement is different from the SCM in some fundamental ways, Steinback (2011) argues that
the reemergence of the Patriot movement rekindled the SCM during the 1990s, the financial

8

crisis of the late 2000s provided fuel for the SCM to grow, and the election of Barack Obama set
the movement aflame.

Emergence of the Modern SCM
The bank crisis and real estate crisis of 2008 had a severe, negative impact on the U.S. economy
resulting in nearly 4 million home foreclosures that displaced 10 million people (Kent, 2015).
Beyond the recession, the proliferation of the Internet and the election of the United States’ first
black president fueled the SCM’s growth. These factors combined to create a situation that made
many far-right extremists anxious and have allowed the SCM to experience continued growth
since 2008 (Steinback, 2011). Indeed, the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) argues that the SCM
has had the largest growth in membership and activity of any anti-government movement within
the United States (2012). Troublingly, there is no indication that the movement is slowing down,
and the literature suggests that each year brings an increase in violent confrontations, fraud, and
intimidation tactics through acts of paper terrorism (ADL, 2012). Recently, the Department of
Homeland Security released a statement claiming that the threat of the SCM is equal to, and at
times greater than, that of foreign terrorist groups such as ISIS and it is an important issue to
address (Perez & Bruer, 2015). Although the SCM has seen continuous growth, little is known
about the nature of the SCM and how the SCM differs from other far-right terrorism.

Research Problem
The Sovereign Citizen Movement is a growing and potentially dangerous form of terrorism, yet
little is known about the nature of the movement. The extant literature and research is generally
anecdotal, and it lacks sufficient, if any, empirical analysis (see, for example, ADL, 2012;
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Federal Bureau of Investigation [FBI], 2011). This lack of research is a significant problem
since state and federal law enforcement officials consider the SCM to be a major threat to the
well-being of the country. According to a recent study conducted by the National Consortium
for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), contemporary law
enforcement agencies are quite concerned with the threat presented by adherents of the SCM,
and consider sovereign citizens a larger threat than groups associated with Christian Identity and
white supremacy; this represents a vast difference in law enforcement attitudes from a few
decades ago (Carter et al., 2014). Current empirical treatment of the SCM poses an interesting
dilemma for researchers, and demands a fresh approach. The SCM is typically discussed within
the broader far-right movement, but should it be?
Carter et al., (2014) suggest that sovereign citizens are quite different when compared to
other right wing individuals due to the fact that SCM ideology is not supremacist in nature.
Rather, the authors maintain, SCM ideology focuses strictly on the government’s illegitimate
authority and not on the social status of individuals associated with minority groups. Grouping
sovereign citizens together with other far-rightists could explain why the existing literature on
the SCM is limited in scope and relatively devoid of empirical findings. This is troubling, as the
available literature provides little in the way of reliable findings to aid either academic or law
enforcement communities. Perhaps researchers should consider the SCM as a unique subgroup
of the far-right, and give them separate treatment altogether. My first research question will
address this issue: How similar are adherents of the SCM to defendants in the broader far-right
movement? Palpable differences would indicate that separate treatment is necessary for future
research.
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Yet another issue that arises in extant research is the focus on violent acts. That approach
is flawed in the case of the SCM. If paper terrorism is the primary threat the SCM poses, the
violence-only focus in studying sovereign citizens is not likely to provide a very detailed or
useful understanding of the subject matter, and more troubling, such research may provide
misleading results. If it is important to develop an understanding of what SCM cases involve,
then a different focus is warranted. One area where the differences between the far-right and the
SCM may be measured is in courtroom behavior. Much is already known about far-right
courtroom behavior, such as plea bargain rates (Shields et al., 2006; Shields, 2008), about the
strategies the federal prosecutors use to process far-right cases (Shields et al., 2009), and about
case outcomes (Shields, 2012), so results from a study of the SCM should provide some
meaningful insight. As will be discussed in the following literature section, some commentators
have expressed concern that SCM adherents use tactics to plug-up and delay the federal court
system. At present, we do not know the extent of this problem, whether it is different from the
broader far-right, or even what it looks like. These issues will be addressed in my secondary
research question: What methods have the federal courts used to prosecute SCM adherents, and
how have those individuals behaved in court?
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CHAPTER THREE
LITERATURE REVIEW

While little of the literature on the Sovereign Citizen Movement is based on the empirical
analysis of data, the extant literature is important, and in many cases, quite rich and detailed. I
have organized this chapter by first reviewing literature on the ideology of the SCM. What
follows is a discussion of the known literature on the structure and organization of the SCM and
what scholars have noted about the changing demographics of the movement. Finally, I will
provide a review of relevant literature on the targets of sovereign citizen adherents as well as the
behaviors practiced by sovereign citizens in the courtroom.

Ideology
Similar to other groups within the far-right, the ideology of the SCM was originally rooted in the
Christian Identity beliefs of anti-Semitism, but it was also marked by a strong anti-government
and anti-taxation stance. Like the Posse Comitatus, the SCM adamantly opposes the authority of
the federal government, which includes paying any form of federal taxes. The literature suggests
that over the years, however, the SCM left behind its Christian Identity roots and embraced an
anti-tax and anti-government ideology devoid of racism (ADL, 2012).
Sovereign citizens—who also call themselves constitutionalists, state citizens, and
freemen to indicate to others that they are not under the jurisdiction of the federal government—
believe that there are two forms of government: an illegitimate government and the original
government (FBI, 2011; Kent, 2015; ADL, 2012). To them the illegitimate government is the
current structure of the federal government in the United States. The SCM believes that at some
point since its founding, the federal government drifted away from the original and intended
12

common law foundation. Common law, unlike the system of law in place today, revolved
around principles of legal precedent rather than legal statutes, which sovereign citizens believe
dates back to the American Revolution after the colonists were freed from British rule and were
granted authority over their individual property (Parker, 2014). According to adherents of the
SCM, the original government did not interfere with its citizens; it governed the people under the
authority of God’s laws. To sovereign citizens, when the government does not govern using
God’s laws it is going against the best interest of the people (ADL, 2012; Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Domestic Terrorism Operations Unit [DTOU], 2010). Interestingly, however,
there are many competing viewpoints within the SCM on when this transition in government
actually occurred and no exact date is available (ADL, 2012).
Even though adherents of the SCM reject the authority of the federal government, they
still use both federal and state laws to construct parts of their ideology, which can be seen
through their interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution (Fleishman,
2004). According to Finch and Flowers (2012), even though the Fourteenth Amendment was
passed in an effort to unify the country after the Civil War, sovereigns believe that the
Amendment was a scam orchestrated by the federal government. SCM adherents believe the
Amendment forced the people of the United States to give up their state citizenship, making
them federal, corporate citizens without their knowledge. Simultaneously, the Amendment
allegedly created a special class of citizenship where citizens would only be allowed certain
rights that were granted to them by the government (ADL, 2012). Sovereign citizens believe that
“the federal government tricked Americans into becoming ‘citizens of the United States’ by
offering them privileges…which were actually hidden contracts with the government through
which Americans unknowingly gave away their sovereignty” (ADL, 2012, p. 3). Because they
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believe they have found the true meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, the only way for
sovereign citizens to become subjects of the illegitimate government is by voluntarily giving up
their common law rights and seeking contracts with the federal government (Parker, 2014).
Examples of these contracts include birth certificates, driver’s licenses, and social security cards.
It should come as no surprise that sovereigns do not carry these items because they believe them
to be null and void (Finch & Flowers, 2012; Fleishman, 2004). Sovereign citizens believe that
obtaining a driver’s license is pointless because the act of driving is regarded as a God-given
right, and law enforcement officers do not have the power to tell them otherwise (Finch &
Flowers, 2012). Additionally, devoted followers of the SCM refuse to use zip codes in their
addresses because they believe using one is tantamount to submitting to the jurisdiction of the
federal government. By simply tearing up these contracts from the government, sovereigns
believe that they retain their common law rights and become “immune to the illegitimate
government” (Anti-Defamation League [ADL], 2005; ADL, 2012, p. 3). In reality, it is simply
not feasible for sovereign citizens to give up every contract with the government, so they
conform under protest when they have to rely on the government for essential needs (Jackson,
2013). An example of this would be sovereign citizens sending their children to a public school
to receive an education.
SCM adherents use a number of justifications to bolster their beliefs about the federal
government, but one of the most important is the Redemption Theory. This theory is the driving
force behind the movement’s desire to defraud banks, credit institutions, and above all, the
federal government and its entities (FBI, 2011). Redemption Theory promotes a belief that the
United States government went bankrupt in 1933 when it abandoned the gold standard as the
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basis for its currency (DTOU, 2010). According to SCM, this left paper money valueless and
allowed the federal government to use its own citizens as collateral to trade with other countries.
Sovereign citizens believe the United States government issues social security numbers
and birth certificates as a means to register U.S. citizens “to be used in trade agreements with
other countries” (FBI, 2011; DTOU, 2010, p. 6). Sovereigns draw this conclusion based on the
practice of the government issuing birth certificates containing names in all capital letters—
sovereigns believe a name spelled in this manner signifies the corporate shell of the person,
rather than the flesh-and-blood person—and print them on bond paper with a government seal
(Southern Poverty Law Center [SPLC], 2010). Once citizens are registered at birth, they believe
each person has a different net worth ranging anywhere from $630,000 to $3 million, although
this amount has been debated. The amount of each person’s individual worth corresponds to his
or her social security number. This money is allegedly kept in accounts under the corporate shell
names of each citizen—in “straw man” accounts—within the U.S. Department of Treasury (FBI,
2011; DTOU, 2010). Sovereign citizens believe that in order to gain access to the money in their
straw man accounts, they must extort the money from the U.S. Treasury by filing “legitimate IRS
and Uniform Commercial Code forms for illegitimate purposes” (FBI, 2011, p.2). Sovereigns
believe that doing so correctly will give them access to these accounts so that they can use the
money to eliminate their mortgages, credit card debts, and car debts (FBI, 2011; Finch &
Flowers, 2012). Essentially, this process is an attempt by sovereign citizens to charge their debt
to the U.S. Treasury Department with the belief that their debts will be paid off by the money in
their individual straw man accounts (DTOU, 2010). In an effort to access their straw man
accounts, many sovereign citizens have resorted to criminal behavior such as mail fraud, money
laundering, or tax violations, while others travel the country teaching fellow adherents how to
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commit fraud and access their accounts for a fee (FBI, 2011). These individuals that travel and
teach are referred to as gurus and will be discussed in more detail later in this section.
The beliefs of the SCM are unusual in that they take legitimate historical events as the
root of their conspiracy theories, but manipulate and obscure those events to use as evidence for
their claims against the government (Finch & Flowers, 2012). According to scholars, sovereign
citizens differ from person to person in their commitment to the ideology because they adhere to
the parts of the ideology that they like and dismiss the aspects that they do not (Fleishman, 2004;
Kent, 2015). Kent (2015) stated that followers of the movement range anywhere from
individuals who make “critical comments among friends, to public statements of displeasure,” to
those who engage in everything from “social protest…to criminal attacks against government
property and politicians” (p. 1). While there are a handful of people who reject the entire
governmental system and follow no rules at all, most sovereign citizens do not reach such a
drastic and dangerous level of adherence and are situated somewhere in the middle of the
spectrum (Jackson, 2013). The following sections will look at the structural make-up of the
movement as well as what we currently know about their courtroom behaviors.

Structure and Demographics
Although sovereign citizens espouse an anti-government ideology, they are not considered
anarchists like individuals associated with far-left terrorism in the 19th and 20th centuries (FBI,
2011; Jensen, 2009). Instead, adherents to the sovereign citizen ideology carry out the ideals of
the movement on an individual basis without the governance of a central office or leadership.
Because sovereign citizens do not act within organized groups, most people are not aware that
the SCM exists (ADL, 2012; IACP Committee on Terrorism [IACP], 2014). However, on
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special occasions members of the SCM do come together informally for a small duration to help
each other with filling out fraudulent documents, creating tax evasion schemes, or simply to talk
to one another about their ideological motivations (FBI, 2011; ADL, 2012; DTOU, 2010).
Because there is no central leadership, it is nearly impossible to know the exact number of
individuals who claim to be sovereign citizens within the United States. According to the
Southern Poverty Law Center (“Sovereign Citizens Movement,” n.d.), in 2011 the SCM had
around 200,000 non-violent followers and another 100,000 who were considered to be hardcore
(potentially violent) sovereigns, for an estimated total of 300,000 nationwide.
Although the exact numbers of the movement are hard to calculate, the Anti-Defamation
League (2012) asserts that determining the personality types and demographics of sovereign
citizens is much easier. People who claim to follow sovereign citizen ideology are typically
middle-aged or older, and the majority of the followers are males. The ADL notes, however, that
a sizeable female population exists, with some of them being gurus (experts on paper terrorism)
within the movement. Historically, members of the SCM have predominantly been white due to
its origins in the Christian Identity Movement, but more recently that has changed. Because the
anti-government ideology is applicable to any race and ethnicity, the number of non-white
sovereign citizens has allegedly grown since the 1990s (ADL, 2012). For instance, there has
been an increase in the number of African Americans in the SCM, with an even larger number
active in the Moorish Movement. African American adherents believe that they hold a
privileged status similar to that of Native Americans. African American sovereign citizens tend
to overlook, or are possibly unaware of, the racist beginnings of the SCM (Nelson, 2011; Parker,
2014).

17

Gurus within the SCM are typically in their 60s and 70s and this has caused law
enforcement to underestimate their propensity towards violence since traditionally violent crimes
are not committed by people in that age group (Hirshi & Gottfredson, 1983). Despite the age of
gurus, some researchers suggest that new growth within the movement has attracted younger
recruits (ADL, 2012). This means that the age range within the movement has the possibility of
being vast.
According to the ADL (2012), the SCM attracts people who are financially stressed,
people who are angry about government regulation, and con artists who want to make money.
The ADL suggests that these people seek out the SCM as a way to escape and find relief for
life’s hardships. But others disagree. While the ADL argues that followers of the SCM can be
evaluated based on specific demographics and characteristics, the IACP (2014) believes that
“sovereign citizens are not typically identifiable by age, gender, distinctive clothing, tattoos,
body piercings, or hair styles” (p. 58-60). In the current study, the demographics of the indictees
will be analyzed in upcoming sections in order to determine if the ADL was correct in their
claims made about the structure and demographics of the SCM.

Targets
While it is beyond the scope of this project to examine the targets of the Sovereign Citizen
Movement, a brief overview of this subject will help inform my hypotheses. The literature
suggests that sovereign citizens predominantly engage in non-violent acts. Moreover, when they
do become violent it is typically spontaneous, where their actions are directed towards law
enforcement officers during home visits or traffic stops; acts of violence can also include threats,
citizen’s arrests, and takeovers of government buildings (ADL, 2012). When stopped by the
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police, sovereign citizens are already on edge. They do not view the officer as a person, but
rather as a symbol of the government that is oppressing their liberties. Pitcavage (1998) argues
that this is the main reason confrontations become dangerous. According to Finch and Flowers
(2012), encounters between law enforcement and sovereign citizens are the most dangerous
during traffic stops because sovereign citizens view traffic stops as unconstitutional. Another
unique SCM view that complicates traffic stops is sovereign citizen’s definition of crime.
Sovereigns maintain that only those actions that harm victims are criminal, and common traffic
violations, such as speeding, lack a victim and are not considered to be crimes (Pitcavage, 1998).
Finch and Flowers (2012) reported that while acts of violence are rare among the SCM, there
have been a few cases of fatal shootings during traffic stops since 2000. An example of this
would be when father and son sovereign citizens, Jerry and Joe Kane, shot and killed two West
Memphis, Arkansas, police officers during a traffic stop in May 2010. During traffic stops,
sovereign citizens have been known to argue with the law enforcement officers about the
officers’ jurisdiction and their right to stop a citizen when traffic violations produce no victim,
however, verbal arguments can turn to violent, physical encounters very quickly.
The literature suggests that the most common tactic of the Sovereign Citizen Movement
is paper terrorism—false liens, financial scams, identity theft, and the like—and these tactics are
frequently directed at the most popular target of the SCM: the federal government and its
employees. Among paper terrorism tactics, tax evasion and tax scams are two of the most
common forms due to sovereign citizen’s anti-tax ideology (ADL, 2012). Tax schemes are
directed at the Internal Revenue Service as well as state taxing authorities as a way to publically
demonstrate sovereign citizens’ discontent with the tax system as a whole. Additionally,
sovereigns use paper terrorism tactics to harass, threaten, intimidate, or retaliate against their
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perceived enemies, such as law enforcement officers, attorneys, judges, and other government
employees (Finch & Flowers, 2012; Steinback, 2011; ADL, 2012; Chamberlain & HaiderMarkel, 2005; Kent, 2015). Furthermore, Fleishman (2004) argues that whenever sovereigns
target someone in particular it is usually a person they believe is directly responsible for the
hardships that the sovereign is facing from the government. Examples of this would be
sovereign citizens filing frivolous lawsuits or liens against the arresting officer or prosecuting
attorney handling their court case.
The literature is not clear when exactly sovereign citizens target certain people.
However, speaking anecdotally, and based on information from the court cases I have coded for
this study, sovereign citizens prefer targeting law enforcement officers and government officials
following an encounter (Smith & Damphousse, 2000); I have found no examples so far to
suggest that sovereign citizens have targeted individuals without a prior confrontation.
As previously stated, law enforcement officers are targeted because SCM adherents see
them as the face of the illegitimate government, and that has the potential of leading to tense
situations when officers cite sovereigns with a ticket during traffic violations, remove them from
squatting in foreclosed homes, or arrest them at their residences (ADL, 2012). Additionally,
attorneys are targeted by the SCM due to the movement’s ideology and conspiracy theories
rooted in radical interpretations of the Constitution. They believe that the “original” Constitution
contained a Thirteenth Amendment1 that would not have granted citizenship to those who hold
titles of nobility. According to Pitcavage (1997), sovereign citizens consider lawyers to be
nobility because attorneys use “Esq.” after their names. Sovereigns also believe that attorneys
1

The radical interpretation of the 13th Amendment lead to the SCM creating common law courts
in an effort to retaliate against officials of the current justice system. For a detailed overview of
the common law court system, refer to Chamberlain & Haider-Markel (2005) and Pitcavage
(1997).
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removed the original Thirteenth Amendment years ago. For both of these reasons, sovereign
citizens are wary of attorneys and the legal system as a whole (Fleishman, 2004). As they do
with police officers, sovereign citizens allegedly target attorneys and other justice system
officials during and after trial.
Sovereigns place liens on their target’s homes as retribution for being arrested by the
police, charged with a crime by the federal prosecutor, or sentenced to time in prison by the
judge. This tactic has caused victims serious financial damage, especially in cases where the
individuals remained unaware a lien was placed on their property or failed to remove it in a
timely fashion (Finch & Flowers, 2012). Finch and Flowers also determined that sovereigns file
lawsuits against law enforcement and government officials to seek reimbursement for the amount
of time the sovereign was detained. Time is very important to sovereign citizens. They maintain
that if government officials waste a sovereign’s time, he or she should reimburse the sovereign
monetarily.
Sovereigns also target government officials with lawsuits by asserting copyright
infringement—for the official’s non-permissive use of the sovereign’s name—as grounds for
legal action. According to the DTOU (2010) “sovereign citizens believe their name is their
personal property and cannot be used by others without prior approval…and that the
unauthorized use of a sovereign citizen’s name entitles them to financial remedy from the
offender. This, in their view, allows them to file a lien against the offender to collect that debt”
(p. 10). These lawsuits and liens, such as with previous examples, can claim millions of dollars
in damages. Sovereign citizens have also been known to target law enforcement officers by
filing false IRS documents that show that the sovereign citizen has paid them a large sum of
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money, which raises red flags with the IRS when the income is not reported on income tax forms
and leaves the officer completely unaware of these actions (IACP, 2014).
Due to the nature of their work, law enforcement and government officials are the most
likely to find themselves in the crosshairs of the SCM. According to Fleishman “even a simple
traffic stop can ripen into years of legal battles with parties who do not recognize the authority of
local government” (2004, p. 9). The bottom line is that no matter how minor or serious the
perceived offenses against them, sovereigns use fictitious liens and lawsuits as a way to
intimidate police officers and members of the justice system (Finch & Flowers, 2012). Indeed,
the majority of law enforcement officers and government officials do not have the training
needed to effectively protect themselves against civil actions brought on by sovereign citizens
(IACP, 2014).

Courtroom Behaviors
Pitcavage (1997) suggests that sovereign citizens target the court system whenever they are on
trial. Sovereigns, unlike typical criminals, often express joy at the prospect of appearing in
court. Like previously stated, they hold the belief that there is a hidden history of the Thirteenth
Amendment and sovereigns do not consider lawyers to be citizens (Pitcavage, 1997). Because of
this, they frequently reject court appointed counsel and defend themselves pro se in an effort to
avoid the attorneys they distrust so much (IACP, 2014). Additionally, Parker (2014) asserts that
sovereign citizens hold a belief that under common law there is no government law or ruling that
can deprive any citizen of their common law rights. SCM adherents warn that these common
laws are under assault. They believe that the illegitimate federal government has attempted to
eclipse the common law via ratification of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments (Parker,
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2014). Sovereigns maintain that the court system is corrupt and no longer follows common law,
but instead, is built on a foundation of commercial and admiralty law. Sovereigns now consider
the courts to be military in nature, and argue they illegitimately administer the laws of the sea
and international commerce (SPLC, 2010). Using these beliefs as the foundation for the
argument that the federal government has no jurisdiction over them, sovereigns challenge the
government’s jurisdiction at trial in an attempt to have their cases dismissed.
Sovereign citizens also bog down the court with fraudulent and frivolous paperwork, in
what Finch and Flowers (2012) call “a conscious effort” to confuse government officials and
disrupt the criminal justice system in hopes that the court will dismiss the case rather than
continuing to deal with them. The authors warn that filing irrelevant and pseudo-legal
paperwork slows down the trial process and risks costing the court system a lot of money over
time. Currently, the literature regarding trial strategies of sovereign citizens is sparse. The
present study will attempt to fill in this gap.
The previous literature offers a comprehensive overview regarding what we currently
know about the composition of people who identify with the SCM, and a discussion of how
scholars think they operate during trials. Under the umbrella of my research questions, I have
framed the following hypotheses to examine the arguments presented in the literature. To test
my first research question I created hypotheses one through three. These hypotheses will be
tested using the demographic variables gender, race, and age at arrest to compare the
differences between the SCM and other far-right adherents.

H1 Sovereign citizens have a higher female population than other far-right adherents
H2 Sovereign citizens have a higher minority population than other far-right adherents
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H3 Sovereign citizens are older than other far-right adherents

To test my second research question I have turned to the literature and developed seven
additional hypotheses. I will analyze these hypotheses using the following variables: trial
outcome, conviction rate, defense method, attorney type, and average number of motions filed.

H4 Sovereign citizens take their cases to trial more often than other far-right
defendants
H5 Sovereign citizens enter fewer plea bargains than other far-right defendants
H6 Sovereign citizens have higher conviction rates than other far-right defendants
H7 Sovereign citizens use a “lack of jurisdiction” defense at a higher rate than other farright defendants
H8 Sovereign citizens appear pro se more often than other far-right defendants
H9 Sovereign citizen court cases are longer on average than those of the other far-right
H10 Sovereign citizens file more motions than other far-right defendants

Each of the aforementioned variables will be discussed more thoroughly below. The following
chapter provides a description of the data and methodology I have employed in the current study
to examine these hypotheses.
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CHAPTER FOUR
DATA AND METHODS

In this chapter I will discuss the data I am using, the inclusion criteria I used to locate and code
Sovereign Citizen Movement cases, the variables I used in the analyses, and the types of
analyses I performed.

American Terrorism Study
For this project, I will use the American Terrorism Study (ATS), which contains data on
federally indicted terrorists, with cases spanning the last 35 years. The ATS is an open-source,
relational database that is comprised of federal court cases, the majority of which are the result of
an FBI terrorism investigation. The ATS uses the FBI’s definition of domestic terrorism when
collecting cases. According to the FBI, domestic terrorism is: “the unlawful use, or threatened
use, of force or violence by a group or individual based and operating entirely within the United
States or Puerto Rico without foreign direction committed against persons or property to
intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof in furtherance
of political or social objectives” (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2005, p. V). That definition
posed a problem for this project. To this point, the ATS did not include SCM cases as a separate
category of the far-right, and the few SCM cases that were included in the database were there
because they met the FBI definition of terrorism, i.e. they were violent in nature (for example,
Posse Comitatus cases). As mentioned above, the literature suggests that most SCM cases are
not violent, but rather focus on paper terrorism. Therefore, I developed inclusion criteria to
locate federal SCM cases.
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I first identified potential cases using online media articles and nonprofit legal advocacy
groups such as the Southern Poverty Law Center and the Anti-Defamation League. These
groups have released numerous articles listing sovereign citizen activity by year and state as well
as individually listing dozens of sovereign citizens by name along with their criminal activity.
Once I identified potential cases through the media, I searched for the individuals via Public
Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER). When I determined that the person of interest had
co-conspirators, I searched for the newly identified codefendants using media documents to
determine whether they were affiliated with the SCM. If they were affiliated, I collected their
court cases and documents as well. Before I included the identified defendants in my SCM
sample, I determined whether the court documents identified the indictees as: 1) adherents of the
SCM; 2) linked to the SCM movement; or 3) the defendants self-identified as sovereign citizens
during the trial. Only defendants who met these criteria were included, allowing for greater
certainty in my analyses. I located 143 SCM cases using the preceding methods (containing 286
defendants), and then I collected court case documents via PACER. I was able to collect
electronic documents on 127 cases (226 defendants), and I completed coding 97 of these cases
and included them in my sample (150 defendants).
I added these cases to the ATS database, and pulled a comparison sample for analysis.
The comparison group in this study is all of the far-right terrorist indictees in the ATS who were
not categorized as modern era (2000-2015) sovereign citizens (N = 382). The ATS categorizes
the far-right as any group or individual that adheres to a radical right-wing ideology. For
example, this could include anti-Semitism, anti-black, white supremacist, or anti-abortion
beliefs. The final sample size for my project is 532 defendants.
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Variables
The majority of the variables I analyzed came from the existing pool of variables in the ATS
database. To examine the hypotheses associated with my first research question, I analyzed
gender, race, education, marital status, age at arrest, and previous military experience.
Education is an ordinal variable that captures the highest education level obtained by the
defendant at the time he or she was indicted. I recoded the variable into six categories (1=8th
grade or less, 2=high school or less, 3=some college, 4=college graduate, 5=post-graduate work,
6=doctorate degree). Marital status is a categorical variable that captures the defendant’s marital
status at the time of indictment (1=single, 2=married, 3=other), and military experience is a
dichotomous variable (Yes=1, No=0) that measures whether the defendant had any prior military
experience when he or she was indicted.
To examine the hypotheses associated with my second research question, I used variables
related to trial characteristics and prosecutorial strategies. These variables include case result,
conviction, case length, prosecution method, defense method, attorney type, and number of
motions filed. Case result is a categorical variable that captures several potential case outcomes.
I recoded the original data into six categories (1=plea, 2=jury conviction, 3=dismissed,
4=acquittal, 5=died prior to trial, 6=pending, all other outcomes were coded system missing).
Conviction is a dichotomous variable that records whether the case resulted in a conviction
(Yes=1, No=0). Case length is a ratio variable that measures the number of months the court
case lasted (from the date of indictment to the date of final judgment).
Prosecution method is a categorical variable that captures the strategies used by
prosecutors during the court case. Prosecution method is operationalized into three categories:
1) conventional criminality; 2) political innuendo/subtle innuendo; and 3) explicit politicality.
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Conventional criminality occurs whenever the prosecution treats the defendant like a traditional
offender; there is no mention of any terrorist groups or ideologies throughout the duration of the
case. Political innuendo/subtle innuendo occurs when the indictment falls silent with regard to
the defendant’s connection to terrorism or a radical ideology, but the prosecutor later hints,
suggests, or implies the connection during other phases of the case or trial. Explicit politicality
occurs when the state makes an explicit link between the defendant and a terrorist group and/or
radical ideology in the indictment. This strategy is characterized by heightened media coverage
as well, and the “explicit” language can appear either through words used by the government
stating that the defendant was involved in terrorist related activities, or it can be the result of the
defendant being charged with terrorism specific charges from the United States Code.
Defense method is a categorical variable that captures the strategies used by the defendant
and/or their legal counsel during the court case. Defense method is operationalized into nine
categories: 1) lack of jurisdiction; 2) good faith; 3) good faith and lack of jurisdiction; 4)
disassociation; 5) conventional; 6) affirmative/self-defense; 7) entrapment; 8) quasi-legal; and 9)
other. To code this variable, I looked at the motions filed by the defense and examined the
language used in defense filings from the time of indictment until the time of judgment. Motions
filed after the judgment had been handed down were not considered. Based on the types of
motions, and the language used in them, I coded the variable into the aforementioned categories.
If two or more defense types were used, I coded the method that was used the most. As my
coding progressed, I had to create new values. The prior defense strategies coded in the ATS did
not contain some of the strategies I found in SCM cases. I included new values for good faith,
lack of jurisdiction and good faith, and quasi-legal. I selected good faith defense whenever the
defendant claimed that tax evasion or tax fraud was the result of the defendant’s
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misinterpretation of the Internal Revenue Laws. When using this strategy, the defense would
cite the Supreme Court ruling of Cheek v. United States (1991), which established that a person
can have an actual good faith belief that they were not violating the law if they honestly
misinterpreted the law and acted in a way that they believed was correct based on their good
faith interpretation; in essence, good faith negates the defendant’s criminal purpose. In each
SCM case I examined, juries found that sovereign citizens had the purpose to defraud the U.S.
government. So despite being used on numerous occasions, this defense was never
successful. The quasi-legal strategy was created in an effort to capture sovereign citizens who
claim that they were not breaking any laws with their actions. The quasi-legal defense consists
of the defendant flooding the court with numerous documents containing citations from real case
law, but interpreted in a bogus and incorrect manner; hence the name quasi-legal. The remaining
method, good faith and lack of jurisdiction, is simply a combination of a lack of jurisdiction
defense, which already existed in the ATS, and the good faith defense. I selected the
combination whenever the defense used both methods equally.
Attorney type is a categorical variable that measures whether the defendant used a private
attorney, appointed counsel/public defender, or if the defendant acted pro se. If multiple
attorney types were used throughout the court case, I coded the attorney type that the defendant
was using at the time the jury reached a verdict, the defendant pleaded guilty, or the case was
dismissed. Number of motions filed is a continuous variable, measuring the number of motions
filed by the defendant in the case. This variable simply measures the number of motions, it
makes no distinctions in the types of motions.
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I divided the sample into a dichotomous variable based on two groups (SCM=1, FarRight=0). I then performed independent samples T-Tests where my independent variables were
ratio or interval. I performed crosstabs when my independent variables were categorical.
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CHAPTER FIVE
RESULTS

The results of this study are separated into two sections. First I will present the descriptive
statistics for demographic variables and trial strategies of the Sovereign Citizen Movement. In
the second section I present bivariate analyses of the SCM and far-right samples for each
hypothesis I tested. After coding the SCM cases I identified, and after pulling the existing farright cases from the ATS, I ended up with a total sample of 532 indictees. That sample consisted
of 150 sovereign citizen indictees and 382 other far-right indictees.

Table 1 Number of indictees for analysis
Category

Number of Indictees

SCM

150

Far-right

382

Total

532

In terms of general demographics of the SCM, the majority of indictees were male and white
with just over 85% and 67% respectively (see Table 2). Additionally, nearly 69% of sovereign
citizens were married, and almost 18% of sovereign citizens had some sort of prior military
experience. In terms of education, sovereign citizens were extremely well educated with nearly
49% being college graduates—almost 12% of indictees in my sample had received a doctorate
degree of some kind. Only 24.5% of sovereign citizens had a high school education or less. In
court cases involving indictees associated with the SCM, over 56% of the cases proceeded to
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trial. Broken down further, the cases resulted in a trial conviction 52% of the time and guilty
pleas nearly 39% of the time, for an overall conviction rate of 91% (See Table 3). When looking
at prosecution method, the government was almost equally as likely to use a conventional
criminality method as they were a political/subtle innuendo method—48.6 % and 50%,
respectively—and less than 2% of indictees experienced explicit politicality. Additionally,
nearly half (43.8%) of sovereign citizens used a conventional defense and over a quarter (26.4%)
of SCM indictees claimed that the federal government lacked jurisdiction to prosecute. Looking
at attorney type, over 54% of sovereign citizens used a public defender during their case, while a
quarter decided on self-representation and appeared pro se.

Table 2 Descriptives of SCM Categorical Variables
Variable

Value

N

Percent

Gender

Male
Female

128
22

85.3
14.7

Race

White
Non-white

91
44

67.4
32.6

Marital Status

Single
Married
Other

18
83
20

14.9
68.6
16.5

Education

Less than 8th grade
High school or less
Some college
College graduate
Post-graduate work
Doctorate

1
22
25
30
5
11

1.1
23.4
26.6
31.9
5.3
11.7
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Table 2 Descriptives of SCM Categorical Variables Cont.
Variable

Value

N

Percent

Prior Military Experience

Yes

24

17.5

Trial Outcome

Plea
Trial conviction
Dismissed
Acquittal
Died prior to trial

58
78
7
6
1

38.7
52
4.7
4
0.7

Prosecution Method

Conventional criminality
Political/subtle innuendo
Explicit politicality

69
71
2

48.6
50
1.4

Defense Method

Lack of jurisdiction
Good faith
Good faith and jurisdiction
Disassociation
Conventional
Affirmative/Self-defense
Entrapment
Quasi-legal

38
16
9
12
63
1
1
4

26.4
11.1
6.3
8.3
43.8
0.7
0.7
2.8

Attorney Type

Pro se
Public defender or CJA
Private attorney

37
81
31

24.8
54.4
20.8

The sovereign citizens in my sample averaged 52 years of age at the time of arrest (see
Table 3), and their average case length was a little over 17 months. Sovereign citizens also filed
an average of 8.71 motions throughout the duration of their court case. Additionally, I have
included the frequencies for the remainder of the far-right using the same variables in Appendix
1.
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Table 3 Descriptives of SCM Variables
Variable

N

Mean

Age at Arrest

115

52.3

Case Length in Months

149

17.09

Avg. Number of Motions Filed

150

8.71

Conviction Rate

150

.91

After running basic descriptive analyses on demographic, trial strategy, and trial behavior
variables, I noted a clear, visible difference between the SCM and far-right on each individual
variable. To determine whether these differences were statistically significant, I performed a
combination of crosstabs and independent samples T-tests. Before I could do that, however, I
noted from my frequencies that some variables contained less than five values per category. I
recoded those variables in order to run accurate crosstabs. Race became a dichotomous variable
(1=white, 0=non-white), and I recoded marital status as a dichotomous variable categorized by
living arrangements (1=cohabitation, 0=non-cohabitation). Cohabitation included defendants
who were married or living with their significant other, and non-cohabitation included
defendants who were single, divorced, separated, or widowed. I recoded education into three
groups (1=high school or less, 2=some college, 3=college graduate or more). Additionally, trial
outcome, prosecution method, and defense method had to be recoded as well. I operationalized
trial outcome into three categories (1=plea, 2=jury conviction, 3=no conviction), where “no
conviction” included acquittals and dismissals. Similarly I recoded prosecution method into a
dichotomous variable (1=politicized, 0=conventional) by combining explicit politicality and
subtle/political innuendo into “politicized” prosecution strategy. Finally, I recoded defense
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method into a dichotomous variable (1=lack of jurisdiction, 0=conventional), where “lack of
jurisdiction” includes lack of jurisdiction, good faith, and good faith and lack of jurisdiction
defenses. Those results follow.

Significance Tests – Demographic Variables
As mentioned above, I ran cross tabulations and independent samples T-tests depending
on the independent variables. T-tests were used to compare age at arrest, case length, number of
motions filed, and conviction rate. Crosstabs were used to compare the categorical variables,
which include: gender, race, marital status, education level, military experience, case outcome,
prosecution method, defense method, and attorney type.

Table 4 Crosstab of gender
Gender

Far-right

SCM

Total

Male

354
92.7%

128
85.3%

482
90.6%

Women

28
7.3%

22
14.7%

50
9.4%

N=150
100

N=532
100

Total
(2 = 6.809

df = 1

N=382
100
p < .01)

There was a substantial difference between the SCM and far-right in terms of gender.
While the majority of both the far-right (92.7%) and SCM (85.3%) were males, Table 4 reveals
that the SCM sample had more than twice the proportion of female indictees (14.7%) than the
remaining far-right (7.3%). The model was statistically significant (p < .01) and supported the
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first hypothesis, which asserted that SCM cases have a higher proportion of female defendants
than other far-right cases.

Table 5 Crosstab of race
Race

Far-right

SCM

Total

White

349
93.3%

91
67.4%

440
86.4%

Non-white

25
6.7%

44
32.6%

69
13.6%

N=374
100
p = .000)

N=135
100

N=509
100

Total
(2 = 56.819

df = 1

Table 5 provides the results of my analysis of the racial composition of the two samples,
and it provides support for my second hypothesis, which asserted that SCM cases have a higher
proportion of minority defendants than other far-right cases. The majority of both the far-right
and SCM samples were white, at around 93% and 67%, respectively, but there were large and
statistically significant differences in the racial composition of both samples (Appendix 2).
Notably, the proportion of black SCM defendants (24.4%) was nearly four times higher than the
far-right sample (6.4%). The SCM sample also contained 3% Asian defendants and 1% Native
Hawaiian/Pacific Islander defendants, where the far-right had none. The model was statistically
significant (p = .000).
The following models on marital status, educational attainment, and military background
are not tied to proposed hypotheses, but do examine the first research question. The results for
marital status are presented in Table 6. A higher proportion of SCM indictees were married or
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living with their significant other (70.2%) than in the far-right sample (56%), and the SCM
sample contained fewer non-cohabitating defendants—29.8% compared to 44%. Of the noncohabitating samples, 14.9% of SCM defendants and 27.6% of far-right defendants were single
(Appendix 3). The marital status model was statistically significant (p < .01).

Table 6 Crosstab of marital status
Marital Status

Far-right

SCM

Total

Cohabitation

150
56%

85
70.2%

235
60.4%

Non-cohabitation

118
44%

36
29.8%

154
39.6%

N=268
100
p < .01)

N=121
100

N=389
100

Total
(2 = 7.106

df = 1

Table 7 Crosstab of education
Education

Far-right

SCM

Total

High school or less

130
54.4%

23
24.5%

153
45.9%

Some college

69
28.9%

25
26.6%

94
28.2%

College graduate or
more

40
16.7%

46
48.9%

86
25.8%

N=94
100

N=333
100

Total
(2 = 40.358

df = 2

N=239
100
p = .000)
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The results of the education model are presented Table 7. Adherents of the SCM were
substantially more educated than the defendants in the far-right sample, and the model was
statistically significant (p = .000). Nearly half of the sovereign citizen defendants (48.9%) had at
least an undergraduate degree as compared to only 16.7% of far-right defendants. By contrast,
the majority of far-right defendants (54.4%) had at most only received a high school diploma,
while only 24.5% of sovereign citizens fell into this category. I ran frequencies on both groups
and the results showed an even more substantial difference (Appendix 4). While almost 49% of
sovereign citizens had at least a college degree, nearly 12% of the sample had received a
doctorate degree of some kind—these degrees were held by people that were doctors, dentists,
and lawyers. None of the far-right indictees had gone on to receive a doctorate degree of any
kind.

Table 8 Crosstab of military experience
Military Experience

Far-right

SCM

Total

Yes

72
38.3%

24
17.5%

96
29.5%

No

116
61.7%

113
82.5%

229
70.5%

N=188
100
p = .000)

N=137
100

N=325
100

Total
(2 = 16.441

df = 1

In Table 8 we found a statistically significant difference (p = .000) in prior military
experience between the two samples. Within the SCM sample, only 17.5% of the indictees had

38

any prior experience, while more than twice the proportion of right wing indictees (38.3%) had
prior military experience.
Additionally, Appendix 5 shows that the difference in age at arrest between the SCM and
far-right was statistically significant (p = .000). The average age at arrest for sovereign citizens
was 52.30 years old and the average age for the far-right was 38.71. Appendix 6 shows a more
detailed breakdown of the sample by age groups in order to show the age ranges of the two
groups.
Each of the analyses above provided statistically significant differences between the
SCM adherents and the far-right defendants contained in the ATS. Each of my first three
hypotheses was supported, suggesting that the answer to my first research question is, yes, the
SCM is demographically dissimilar to the far-right. But that only completes part of my analyses.
In the next section I report the findings on my second research question: whether SCM adherents
are treated differently than other far-right defendants in the court, and whether SCM adherents
behave differently in court than do other far-right defendants.

Significance Tests – Courtroom Behavior Variables
In Table 9 we see the first examination of variables related to the second research
question. The majority of SCM indictees (52%) were convicted by a jury, while just under 39%
pleaded guilty prior to trial. The far-right shows a very different trend. Nearly 52% of right
wing indictees pleaded guilty prior to trial, and just over 31% were convicted by a jury.
Additionally, over 17% of far-right defendants and over 9% of SCM defendants received no
conviction at all. Another interesting result was the higher acquittal and dismissal rates enjoyed
by the far-right (7.7% for each) (Appendix 7). By contrast, SCM defendants secured acquittals
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just 4% of the time, and dismissals just 4.7% of the time. The case result model was statistically
significant (p = .000). The results generally supported H4, which asserted that sovereign citizens
take their cases to trial more than other far-right defendants, and H5, which asserted that SCM
defendants enter into fewer plea bargains than other far-right defendants.

Table 9 Crosstab of trial outcome
Trial Outcome

Far-right

SCM

Total

Plea

193
51.5%

58
38.7%

251
47.8%

Jury conviction

117
31.2%

78
52%

195
37.1%

No conviction

65
17.3%

14
9.3%

79
15%

N=150
100

N=525
100

Total
(2 = 20.709

df = 2

N=375
100
p = .000)

Table 10 Crosstab of prosecution method
Prosecution Method

Far-right

SCM

Total

Conventional

57
16.9%

69
48.6%

126
26.3%

Politicized

281
83.1%

73
51.4%

354
73.8%

N=338
100
p = .000)

N=142
100

N=480
100

Total
(2 = 51.993

df = 1
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I did not posit a hypothesis on prosecution strategies, but examined this variable because
it is tied to the second research question, and could potentially influence defendant behavior.
Table 10 reveals (p = .000) that federal prosecutors used different strategies to prosecute SCM
defendants than they used with far-right defendants. The majority of both far-right and SCM
defendants experienced politicized prosecution—83.1% and 51.4%, respectively. However, only
16.9% of the far-right experienced a conventional method, while almost 49% of sovereign
citizens experienced that same method. Appendix 8 shows a more interesting breakdown of
prosecution methods between the two groups that could not be shown with the recoding of this
variable. Prosecutors were more likely to use a political/subtle innuendo prosecution strategy on
sovereign citizens (50%) than on far-rightists (29%). In fact, the results revealed that prosecutors
treat far-right defendants more aggressively, exposing them to explicit politicality prosecution
strategies more than half the time (54.1%), whereas sovereign citizen indictees were subjected to
explicit politicality less than 2% of the time.
Sovereign citizens behaved differently at trial as well (see Table 11). Sovereign citizens
used unique defenses at trial and defense methods were used to test H7. Defendants in the SCM
sample used lack of jurisdiction, good faith, and a combination of good faith/lack of jurisdiction
at a rate of 32.6%, while far-right defendants used this method only 12.4% of the time. This is
important, as the good faith defense and the good faith/lack of jurisdiction defenses were created
specifically for SCM court cases, as they do not occur in far-right cases. But there were
similarities between the two groups as well. Nearly 68% of sovereign citizens and nearly 88% of
far-rightists used a conventional defense in their trials. This model was statistically significant (p
= .000) and generally supported H7, which stated that sovereign citizens use lack of jurisdiction
defense at a higher rate than other far-right defendants.
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Table 11 Crosstab of defense method
Defense Method

Far-right

SCM

Total

Conventional

282
87.6%

97
67.4%

379
81.3%

Lack of jurisdiction

40
12.4%

47
32.6%

87
18.7%

N=322
100
p = .000)

N=144
100

N=466
100

Total
(2 = 26.783

df = 1

When comparing differences in attorney type, the majority of sovereign citizens and farrightists were represented by a public defender or CJA at a rate of 54.7% and 74.1%,
respectively (see Table 12). Importantly, Sovereign citizens were more likely to appear pro se
(almost 25% of the time) than right-wing indictees (14%). Additionally, the rate of private

Table 12 Crosstab of attorney type
Attorney Type

Far-right

SCM

Total

Pro se

47
14%

37
24.7%

84
17.3%

Public defender or
CJA

249
74.1%

82
54.7%

331
68.1%

Private attorney

40
11.9%

31
20.7%

71
14.6%

N=336
100
p = .000)

N=150
100

N=486
100

Total
(2 = 18.046

df = 2
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attorney representation with the SCM is almost double that of the far-right—20.7% compared to
11.9%. Differences in attorney type proved to be statistically significant (p = .000) and provided
support for H8 that sovereign citizen indictees are more likely to use self-representation than
other far-right defendants.
Table 13 provides the results for my analyses of case lengths, number of motions filed,
and conviction rates. The mean case length involving sovereign citizens (17.05 months) was
over five months longer than cases involving far-right indictees (11.68 months), providing
support for H9, which asserted that SCM court cases would be longer than far-right cases. The
Levene’s test indicated that the variances were equal (Sig. .062), and the results were statistically
significant (p = .000). The mean number of motions filed by the sovereign citizen indictees
(8.71) was less than half the number of motions filed by far-rightists (20.72). The Levene’s test
showed that variances were not equal (Sig. .000), but the results were statistically significant (p =
.000). These results did not support H10. Finally, analysis revealed that the conviction rate of

Table 13 Differences between SCM and Far-right Independent Samples T-Tests
Factor

Group

N

Mean

Std. Dev.

Sig.

Average case length SCM
Far-right

150
369

17.05
11.68

12.98
12.70

.000*

Num. of motions
filed

SCM
Far-right

150
332

8.71
20.72

10.29
36.43

.000**

Conviction rate

SCM
Far-right

150
375

.91
.83

.29
.38

.01**

* equal variance assumed
** equal variance not assumed
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sovereign citizens (91%) was higher than for indictees associated with the far-right (83%). The
Levene’s test revealed that equal variances were not assumed (Sig. .000). The difference in
conviction rates was statistically significant (p = .01) and the results supported H6, which posited
that sovereign citizens have a higher conviction rate than other far-right defendants.
Whether comparing the SCM to the far-right with demographic factors, trial behaviors, or
trial strategies, there are substantial differences. The bivariate analyses revealed that every
measure was statistically significant, which strongly supports the proposition that the two groups
should be analyzed separately, as not doing so would cloud important distinctions. In the
following chapter I will discuss the implications further.
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CHAPTER SIX
DISCUSSION AND LIMITATIONS

This study examines the differences that are present between the Sovereign Citizen Movement
and the far-right in basic demographic composition and trial strategies and behaviors. The
analysis revealed that there are significant differences, and at times, substantial differences, in
every variable analyzed. This has implications for the ways in which most research is currently
being conducted. In this chapter, I will present an argument that supports analyzing the SCM
separately from the far-right in future research. I will also discuss a few of the limitations of this
study.
For the first research question, I tested a number of hypotheses to determine whether the
SCM was similar demographically to the rest of the far-right. The majority of both the SCM and
the far-right samples are males, however, the SCM has a significant number of females (14.7%),
which is more than twice the proportion of females in the far-right (7.3%). One explanation is
that perhaps the non-violent focus of paper terrorism is more appealing to women. Another
likely cause is the SCM’s shift away from Christian Identity ideology, which traditionally placed
women in subordinate roles to men. The anti-tax and anti-government ideology of the SCM does
not appear to embrace gender distinctions, but more research needs to be focused in this area.
There were significant and substantial differences in the racial composition between the
SCM and the far-right. Nearly one-quarter of the SCM sample was black; black indictees were
part of a non-white sample that totaled almost 33%. In contrast, the far-right sample contained a
relatively small (6.7%) proportion of non-white indictees, and many of the minorities indicted
were not group members, but merely got caught up as co-defendants in complex conspiracies.
The increase in the minority population within the SCM is most likely a result of the movement
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moving away from the racist roots of Christian Identity (ADL, 2012). The literature suggests
that the SCM has shifted to an ideology that is based solely on anti-tax and anti-government
beliefs, and as a result blacks are increasingly becoming a part of the SCM and the related
Moorish Movement. I found support for Nelson’s (2011) and Parker’s (2014) contentions that
blacks are choosing to overlook the racist roots of the SCM and adhere to the current raciallybenign anti-government ideology.
One of the more glaring differences I noted was in educational attainment. Overall,
sovereign citizens were much more educated than the other far-right defendants. Over half of the
sovereign citizens in the sample had attained a college degree, while most far-right indictees
received, at most, a high school education. There are a few possible explanations for this. First,
the schemes used by the SCM involving tax evasion and fraudulent liens might require a higher
educational background to understand and initiate. It might also be possible that more highly
educated people are attracted to the non-violent SCM ideology and tactics than they are to the
violent far-right. The loose nature of the SCM might also be more attractive to individuals with
higher educational attainment. As was mentioned in the literature review, SCM adherents are
largely “in it alone.” They ignore the parts of the ideology they do not like, while embracing the
parts they do. That is probably much different than members of the far-right, and especially farright groups, which are more likely to require allegiance to the entire ideology. In either case,
this should be addressed in future research.
The average age of sovereign citizens was around 13 years older than indictees in the farright. Remarkably, the standard deviation for the far-right sample on the variable of age was
slightly higher than the SCM sample, and that combined with the t-test results (in Appendix 5)
indicate that the difference between the groups is real, and not the product of outliers. So not
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only does the SCM appeal to a wider ranger of people racially, to more women, and to people of
higher educational attainment, it also appeals to an older demographic.
Another difference is somewhat puzzling, but also quite telling. The far-right sample
contained more than twice the proportion of people with military backgrounds than did the
sovereign citizens sample. I cannot find much in the literature to explain this difference. The
difference could be a reflection of educational attainment, and it could be a result of greater
gender diversity. It is also possible that the non-violent tactics and ideology of the SCM are
more attractive to a broader range of people (military and non-military alike), whereas the
violent tactics of the far-right holds particular appeal to a smaller group of individuals, including
those with a military background (Simi & Bubolz, 2013).
In terms of marital status, the majority of both the SCM and far-right defendants were
married. However, sovereign citizens were married at a rate of nearly 15% higher than farrightists. One explanation for this might again turn towards the non-violent tactics of the SCM.
Individuals might be more inclined to adopt non-violent SCM extremist ideologies when they are
part of a stable family unit, while single and divorced individuals, without the stability of
marriage, might be less inhibited by the violence of the far-right. Another explanation of this
could be correlated to education level. The National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (U.S.
Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor and Statistics, 1979) asserts that men who had received a
bachelor’s degree were more likely to be married than men who had not graduated from college.
Moreover, the study suggests that divorce rates were inversely related to education level and that
more than 50% of respondents who had not received a high school diploma had marriages that
ended in divorce. Sovereign citizens are significantly more likely to have received a college
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degree, which could explain why their marriage rates are higher and divorce rates are lower,
where the inverse might explain the far-right.
The results are similar for research question two: the SCM and far-right are significantly
different from each other when looking at trial strategies and defendant behaviors. The analysis I
performed on the differences in trial outcomes revealed that over half of sovereign citizens are
convicted by jury at trial, and just over 31% of far-right cases result in jury conviction. In all,
56% of SCM cases go to trial. That is an astounding number, but it is entirely inconsistent with
the literature, which suggests that SCM defendants tend to use the courts as a means to fight
what they see as an illegitimate government. The literature also suggests that the far-right (and
terrorists in general) have a habit of using the courts as a platform to spread their agenda (Shields
et al., 2006), and that cases involving terrorism defendants typically involve lower plea bargain
rates (Smith, 1994; Damphousse & Shields, 2007; Shields et al., 2009; Shields, 2012).
Nonetheless, the difference between the SCM and the far-right is startling. Almost 52% of farright cases result in a guilty plea prior to trial, which is much lower than the national average
(96%), but SCM cases result in guilty pleas less than 40% of the time. Shields (2012) found a
correlation between negative case dispositions (higher trial rates and fewer convictions) in
terrorism cases and the prosecution’s use of an explicit politicality prosecution method (a highly
politicized trial strategy used in high profile cases). That, however, was not the case here. SCM
cases in this sample were prosecuted using a non-politicized strategy (common criminality) as
frequently as they were prosecuted using a slightly politicized strategy. While prosecutors did
use some moderately politicized prosecution strategies against the SCM, Shields’ (2012) study
did not find a significant relationship between the “middle” approach and a defendant’s decision
to take his or her case to trial. As I did not run a multivariate analysis in this study, I cannot say
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whether the middle strategy has a different impact on SCM defendants. It might. But there is
another possibility; the results tend to support trends reported in the literature, that SCM
defendants intend to bog down the court (IACP, 2014).
The literature suggests that there is an inherent risk when the government uses an explicit
politicality prosecution method. Not only does it increase media coverage, it substantially
reduces the likelihood that defendants will force their cases to trial, and when at trial, their odds
of gaining an acquittal or a dismissal go up (Shields, 2008; Shields et al., 2009). Once again, we
find different results. As mentioned above, even though the government pursues the far-right
with explicit politicality much more often than the SCM, the SCM is far more likely to not only
go to trial, but almost counter intuitively, to get convicted. This is probably a function of the
defense strategies used. And once again, the defense methods used by the SCM and far-right are
dramatically different. While the majority of both sovereign citizens and far-rightists used a
conventional defense, over 32% of sovereign citizens and over 12% of the remaining far-right
used either good faith, lack of jurisdiction, or a combination of the two defenses. Another factor
that is probably contributing to their high conviction rates is tied to their ideology and rooted in
their distrust of attorneys. Among SCM defendants, 24.7% appeared pro se. Pro se defenses are
notoriously ineffective. Again, this probably accounts for some of the increased conviction rate.
The available literature suggests that sovereign citizens take pleasure in filing numerous
documents during trial proceedings in an effort to harass the court system into dropping their
case; they believe the best way to do this is to file numerous motions. While I found no support
for my hypothesis predicting that sovereign citizens would try to bog down the court with
motions, the explanation for this may be linked to the defendants appearing pro se in such great
numbers. Licensed attorneys are intimately more familiar with defense proceedings and file
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motions to cover any manner of issues as a case progresses. Pro se defendants are most likely
unfamiliar with many of these. Ergo, pro se defendants just file fewer motions. Another
possibility is also very likely. SCM defendants use paper terrorism against actors in the
courtroom, prosecutors, judges, and law enforcement officers. Paper terrorism, such as a
fraudulent tax lien, is not accomplished by filing a motion in a criminal hearing, so any real
retaliation the defendants are engaging in will not show up in the court records. It is worth
noting, however, that SCM cases are generally longer in length than far-right cases. Future
studies will have to determine why this is the case.
Although all of the differences in the findings were statistically significant, there were
certain limitations to the study. Due to time constraints I was not able to code all of the cases
that I had collected. The remaining cases will be coded at some point in the future, and these
analyses will be easy to reproduce. Also, the sample in this study only included non-violent acts,
and that is because I did not come across any violent sovereign citizen court cases at the federal
level. According to the literature sovereign citizens typically engage in violent acts when
confronted by law enforcement officers during traffic stops or residence visits. This means that
violent cases are most likely to appear in state court. The addition of state SCM cases would be
beneficial to future analyses. Finally, the average number of motions for the SCM could be low
due to how I coded this variable. I only counted documents labeled as “motions” when I should
have also included “demands” in the total number of motions filed. That will need to be
addressed in the future. Additionally, it would be beneficial to count all of the quasi-legal
paperwork filed by sovereign citizens. Most sovereign citizens filed numerous pro se
documents, but they were not filed as motions. Rather they were filed as “notices” and
“affidavits” and for this reason were not counted as motions filed. However, these filings are
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still being used to bog down the court system, and should be looked at more closely in future
research. These limitations will be addressed in more detail, as well as suggestions for future
research, in the following section.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
FUTURE RESEARCH

The current study has clearly shown that there are significant differences between the Sovereign
Citizen Movement and the far-right, however, this study is only creating a foundation for future
research. There are still large steps to be taken to understand more completely how the SCM
operates and what role it plays within the broader far-right movement. This section will list a
few areas of study that I believe will be beneficial to analyze in the future.
One area of future research that needs to be investigated involves the collection and
analysis of state SCM court cases. This will permit the capture of missing data on violent
sovereign citizen incidents. Including violent perpetrators into the analysis will allow for a more
robust sample to compare to the far-right in order to determine whether there are still significant
differences between the two groups. Furthermore, if the differences between the far-right and
SCM diminish with the addition of violent sovereign citizens, then more research must be
conducted to determine how sovereign citizens who engage in violence are different from those
who choose paper terrorism as their primary tactic. Even though no state court cases were
included in the current study due to ATS methodology and inclusion criteria, the results
presented above provide an accurate picture of how the SCM relates to the broader far-right—
adding violent sovereign citizens to the data set will allow for more comprehensive analyses.
Future research should also focus on the tactics and targets of the SCM. The available
literature suggests the SCM uses a vast number of tactics and selects ideologically motivated
targets; yet, again there have been no empirical studies to date. It is important to determine
whether sovereign citizens actually use paper terrorism tactics in the ways suggested in the
literature, and to study the frequency with which they focus their attentions towards targets
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affiliated with the government and law enforcement. That information could prove crucial in
efforts to combat adherents of the SCM. During the course of this project I collected information
on the tactics and targets associated with each of the SCM court cases I coded. However, due to
the ultimate direction the project took, I was unable to evaluate these data. Nonetheless, I
believe these data hold promise for future research.
The literature suggests that unlike typical criminals, sovereign citizens are more likely to
continue operating at every level of incarceration. As with tactics and targets, I also collected
data on whether the defendants were indicted for actions they carried out while in prison. I think
future research on this area is vital to understanding how extensive the threat of incarcerated
sovereign citizens may be. The literature states that sovereign inmates utilize the prison libraries
to research case law in an effort to continually develop new ways to create and file fraudulent
legal and financial documents and engage in criminal activity (DTOU, 2010). Understanding
SCM operations behind bars and stopping them before they begin could help to substantially
reduce the number of retaliatory liens and lawsuits targeting law enforcement and government
officials that are being filed from prison.
As I read through hundreds of court documents I noted a pattern in sovereign citizen pro
se court document filings; there is an obvious connection to religion within the movement. The
vast majority of pro se filings contained numerous Bible verses, which the authors used as a tool
to support the radical arguments they were making. Although the SCM is no longer under the
umbrella of Christian Identity, the movement’s ideology is still rooted in the belief that the
federal government is illegitimate because it is no longer governing by God’s law (ADL, 2012).
In future studies it would be interesting to focus on how the SCM uses religious references, and
for what purpose.
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Finally, I suggest that future research looks at the actions of sovereign citizens during the
trial (i.e. targeting judges and prosecutors with lawsuits). I came across a handful of examples
where sovereign citizens used aggressive paper terrorism tactics during trial proceedings in an
effort to harass government representatives to drop their cases. This includes filing frivolous
lawsuits, demanding payment to be made to the sovereign citizen because the court system used
their real name, and filing liens against prosecutors in retaliation to them bringing charges
against the sovereign. Currently the ATS does not collect data on any variables that would
capture these types of tactics used during trial; so new variables would have to be made. This
would be important to research in order to better educate the workers of the legal system on what
to look for and how to protect themselves from being the victims of paper terrorism.
Continuing to conduct research on the Sovereign Citizen Movement is vital to the
understanding of the movement and to continue building on the still lacking knowledge on the
details of how the SCM operates.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
CONCLUSION

The literature that preceded this study was largely anecdotal and lacked empirical research.
What was known about the Sovereign Citizen Movement was focused towards basic
demographics, tactics, and targets of the movement, with no focus on SCM trial strategies and
behaviors. The current study adds to the available literature by providing an empirical
examination of the demographic composition of the SCM, as well as an examination of how
sovereign citizens and prosecutors behave during the course of criminal trials. This study reveals
statistically significant differences between the SCM and far-right—all but one of my hypotheses
were supported—and illustrates the need to treat the two groups separately in future analyses.
The SCM and far-right are demographically different from one another and they operate
differently at trial.
Future research must also explore the SCM and its relationship to the far-right even
further. This might include the addition of state-level violent SCM cases to the sample, and it
should probably involve a thorough investigation of the tactics and targets associated with
sovereign citizen adherents. Importantly, research needs to be conducted on how sovereign
citizens target government officials during their trials and how they continue to operate while
incarcerated. This study has created a foundation for future research on the SCM to be built
upon. This project reveals for the first time that there is in fact a significant difference between
the SCM and far-right while also providing evidence of how the two groups are different. What
is not known, however, is why they are different and that is the next question that needs to be
answered.
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CHAPTER TEN
APPENDICES

Appendix 1 Descriptives of Far-right Categorical Variables
Variable

Value

N

Percent

Gender

Male
Female

354
28

92.7
7.3

Race

White
Non-white

349
25

93.3
6.7

Marital Status

Single
Married
Other

74
145
49

27.6
54.1
18.3

Education

Less than 8th grade
High school or less
Some college
College graduate
Post-graduate work
Doctorate

7
123
69
37
3
0

2.9
51.5
28.9
15.5
1.3
0

Prior Military Experience

Yes

72

38.3

Trial Outcome

Plea
Trial conviction
Dismissed
Acquittal
Died prior to trial
Awaiting trial

193
117
29
29
4
3

51.5
31.2
7.7
7.7
1.1
0.8

Prosecution Method

Conventional criminality
Political/subtle innuendo
Explicit politicality

57
98
183

16.9
29
54.1
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Appendix 1 Descriptives of Far-right Categorical Variables Cont.
Defense Method

Lack of jurisdiction
Good faith
Good faith and jurisdiction
Disassociation
Conventional
Affirmative/Self-defense
Quasi-legal

40
0
0
78
157
3
0

12.4
0
0
24.2
48.8
0.9
0

Attorney Type

Pro se
Public defender or CJA
Private attorney

47
249
40

14
74.1
11.9

Appendix 2 Frequencies of Race for the SCM and Far-right
Race

Far-right

SCM

Total

White

349
93.3%

91
67.4%

440
86.4%

Black

24
6.4%

33
24.4%

57
11.2%

Asian

0
0%

4
3%

4
0.8%

Native Hawaiian or
Pacific Islander

0
0%

1
0.7%

1
0.2%

Other

1
0.3%

6
4.4%

7
1.4%

Total

N=374
100

N=135
100

N=509
100
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Appendix 3 Frequencies of Marital Status for the SCM and Far-right
Marital Status

Far-right

SCM

Total

Single

74
27.6%

18
14.9%

92
23.7%

Married

145
54.1%

83
68.6%

228
58.6%

Other

49
18.3%

20
16.5%

69
17.7%

Total

N=268
100

N=121
100

N=389
100

Appendix 4 Frequencies of Education for the SCM and Far-right
Education

Far-right

SCM

Total

8th grade or less

7
2.9%

1
1.1%

8
2.4%

High school or less

123
51.5%

22
23.4%

145
43.5%

Some college

69
28.9%

25
26.6%

94
28.2%

College graduate

37
15.5%

30
31.9%

67
20.1%

Post-graduate work

3
1.3%

5
5.3%

8
2.4%

Doctorate

0
0%

11
11.7%

11
3.3%

Total

N=239
100

N=94
100

N=333
100
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Appendix 5 Age at Arrest Independent Samples T-Test
Factor

Group

Age at arrest

SCM
Far-right
* equal variances assumed

N

Mean

Std. Dev.

Sig.

115
340

52.30
38.71

12.32
12.67

.000*

Appendix 6 Frequencies of Age at Arrest by Age Group for the SCM and Far-right
Age Group

Far-right

SCM

Total

1 to 20

14
4.1%

2
1.7%

16
3.5%

21 to 40

187
55%

16
13.9%

203
44.6%

41 to 60

122
35.9%

65
56.5%

187
41.1%

61 or older

17
5%

32
27.8%

49
10.8%

Total

N=340
100

N=115
100

N=455
100
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Appendix 7 Frequencies of Trial Outcome for the SCM and Far-right
Trial Outcome

Far-right

SCM

Total

Plea

193
51.5%

58
38.7%

251
47.8%

Jury conviction

117
31.2%

78
52%

195
37.1%

Dismissed

29
7.7%

7
4.7%

36
6.9%

Acquittal

29
7.7%

6
4%

35
6.7%

Died prior to trial

4
1.1%

1
0.7%

5
1%

Awaiting trial

3
0.8%

0
0%

3
0.6%

Total

N=375
100

N=150
100

N=525
100

Appendix 8 Frequencies of Prosecution Method for the SCM and Far-right
Prosecution Method

Far-right

SCM

Total

Conventional Criminality

57
16.9%

69
48.6%

126
26.3%

Political/subtle innuendo

98
29%

71
50%

169
35.2%

Explicit politicality

183
54.1%

2
1.4%

185
38.5%

Total

N=338
100

N=142
100

N=480
100
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Appendix 9 Research Compliance Protocol Letter
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